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Abstract
This paper explores the behavior of emerging market mutual funds using a
novel database covering the holdings of individual funds over the period
January 1996 to March 1999. An examination of individual crises shows that,
on average, funds withdrew money one month prior to the events. The
degree of herding among funds is statistically significant, but moderate.
Herding is more widespread among open-ended funds than among closed-
end funds, but not more prevalent during crises than during tranquil times.
Funds tend to follow momentum strategies, selling past losers and buying
past winners, but their overall behavior is more complex than often
suggested.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Episodes of high volatility in international capital flows and currency crises in the
1990s have put international investors in the limelight. Frequently, international investors are
considered the culprits of the bouts of instability and crises,
2 and casual observation does
suggest the presence of episodes of panic and contagion. Yet the question remains as to
whether there is a tendency for certain market participants to disregard fundamental
economic conditions in emerging markets, responding only to what other investors are doing,
or are expected to do. The presence of such herding behavior, to the extent it dominates
international capital flows, would help in explaining periods of seemingly excessive volatility
of capital flows and asset prices in emerging markets and have important policy implications.
Assessing the behavior of international investors in a systematic way, however, poses
difficult challenges. Most of the available financial information consists of data on prices. It
is nearly hopeless to attempt to control for all “fundamental” news driving changes in asset
prices, making it impossible to convincingly establish that a specific change in asset prices
was due to herding behavior by certain groups of investors. Moreover, herding behavior by
international investors may have adverse balance-of-payments consequences for countries
even in the absence of a large immediate impact on stock prices.
For these reasons, researchers have begun to examine investor behavior in emerging
markets directly using data on investors’ portfolios and transactions. However, the
availability of such data is scarce, and the evidence presented so far for emerging markets is
limited. The most comprehensive data set used so far is probably the daily data from State
Street Bank & Trust examined by Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (1998). The authors find
evidence for persistence and trend-following in portfolio flows. In addition, the data indicate
that inflows have forecasting power for future returns in emerging markets, but not mature
markets. While their data set is very detailed on transactions, it does not allow the researcher
to differentiate between different classes of investors. Other studies have had a regional or
country-specific focus.
This paper contributes to this literature by exploring a novel data set that covers
around 400 emerging market equity funds on a monthly basis over the period January 1996–
March 1999; it is the first one to document the behavior of mutual funds on a global scale.
While the period is relatively short, it encompasses the Asian, Czech, Russian, and Brazilian
crises, allowing us to examine each of these episodes in detail. While not intending to cover
these issues exhaustively, the aim of the paper is to provide some tentative answers to the
following questions. How do emerging market funds behave before, during, and after crises?
Is there evidence for herding among these funds during tranquil and during turbulent times?
Are there meaningful differences in the behavior of different types of funds? Do funds
systematically buy past winners and sell past losers?
3
                                                
2 See, for example, Aitken (1996) and Richards (1996) for analyses of stock prices in
emerging markets.
3 We do not examine the impact of  funds’ behavior on their performance here, but intend to
take up the issue in another paper.- 4 -
Note that it only makes sense to search for evidence of herding within a subset of
investors, since the whole market cannot move in the same direction (overall, for every
seller, there must be a buyer). In this regard, our database has the advantage of covering a
well-specified subclass of investors, for which it is meaningful and interesting to pose these
questions.
We find that, overall, the behavior of funds is complex and cannot be explained by
simplistic rules. While during tranquil and turbulent times, inflows coexist with outflows, on
a net basis, these funds tend to withdraw money one month prior to crises. Interestingly,
funds did not withdraw indiscriminately from emerging markets: in many cases, the same
funds that left a crisis country invested in other markets that at the time were seen as
suffering from contagion. Using a VAR methodology, we investigate whether specific types
of funds systematically move first, finding that in- or outflows by regional or single-country
funds Granger-cause flows of global/international funds into the same country. The results
also show that open-ended funds’ flows Granger-cause closed-end funds investments.
Statistical measures of  the degree of herding, as proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) are found to be significantly different from zero, but lower than what one
might have expected. Herding is less pronounced among closed-end funds, suggesting that
herding behavior might be to a significant extent traceable to individual investors’, rather
than managers’ behavior. Across countries and over time, we find a correlation between the
degree of herding and stock market volatility. Various statistical measures provide some
evidence that emerging market funds follow momentum strategies, and more so when selling
than when buying.
II.  CONTAGION, HERDING, AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
In the discussion about recent financial crises, attention has largely focused on the
behavior of international investors. It has been argued that some of these—mainly
institutional—investors engage in herding strategies, i.e. have a tendency to “follow the
pack”, mimicking trades by other market participants, without paying due attention to
fundamentals. Such behavior could potentially destabilize prices, and, if widespread, would
constitute an argument in favor of limiting the free movement of capital flows.
Herding might or might not be consistent with traditional models of rational, utility-
maximizing investors. Explanations that at least partly depart from the rationality paradigm
are based on panics or sudden contagious changes in investor sentiment. These types of
changes in investor sentiment may in turn induce a switch from a “good” to a “bad”
equilibrium for a country and induce a crisis.
4  Herding-like behavior may for example occur
if a single event that per se does not convey much information about fundamentals suddenly
acts as a wake-up call, reviving faded memories of similar previous events.
5 Note that once
                                                
4 See Masson (1998).
5 See Mullainathan (1998).- 5 -
there is a widespread “change in sentiment” in the markets, in many conceivable scenarios it
is still fully rational from the individual investor’s perspective to “follow the pack”.
However, one does not need to introduce elements of irrationality to explain herding
behavior. Rationalizations include informational learning (cascades), principal-agent
problems or other externalities.
6 Informational cascades occur when actions are observable,
but information is partly private. In such a situation, agents’ actions provide valuable
information to others, and in some cases it may be optimal to rely exclusively on others’
actions. This is particularly relevant if there are fixed costs of acquiring information about a
company, or in the case of interest here, a country.
7
Since institutional investors are more informed about each other’s trades than
individual investors, they can be expected to herd more.
8 Herding that results from
informational cascades constitutes a case for more “transparency”, i.e. governments and
international institutions providing markets with more and more timely information.
9 An
example of a principal-agent explanation of herding, on the other hand, is given by the
possibility that fund managers are evaluated based on relative instead of absolute
performance, which provides an incentive to mimic the actions of other managers.
10
A related behavior of investors is given  by “momentum strategies”. In the finance
literature, it has been documented that domestic U.S. mutual funds engage in “positive
feedback trading”,
11 buying those assets whose prices have been rising and selling assets
whose prices have been falling. This behavior can be the result of extrapolative price
expectations, collateral or margin calls, dynamic hedging, or other strategies that prescribe
automatic selling or buying in reaction to price movements.
12
Lastly, international investors may appear to herd if they react simultaneously to the
same fundamentals. In this case, their behavior speeds up the adjustment of prices and is not
destabilizing.
13 However, in an efficient market, speedy price adjustment should occur
without many actual trades having to take place. Moreover, the question remains why
international investors react differently to these news than domestic investors. Here, Brennan
                                                
6 See Devenow and Welch (1996) for a overview of rational herding models and
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) for a more recent survey of the theoretical and empirical
literature.
7 For an example, see Calvo and Mendoza (1997).
8 See Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) (henceforth LSV).
9 See Eichengreen et al. (1998), p. 23.
10 See Scharfstein and Stein (1990) or Calvo and Mendoza (1997).
11 See DeLong et al. (1990).
12 See Eichengreen et al. (1998) and Kim and Wei (1999b). Professional investment
managers occasionally recommend this strategy to their clients. For example, the Los
Angeles Times quotes Templeton Developing Markets manager Mark Mobius suggesting
with respect to holdings of emerging-market funds: “You say, ‘If the fund goes down this
much, I’m out’.” See Lim (1999).
13 See LSV.- 6 -
and Cao (1997) argue that, since foreign investors have a “cumulative informational
disadvantage”, positive news about a country will result in a reallocation of asset holdings
toward foreigners. Similarly, foreign investors in emerging markets may hold more
diversified portfolios than domestic investors, so that they react differently to news about,
say, the correlation of an emerging market’s stock index with U.S. stock indices.
The empirical literature examining directly the behavior of international investors is
still sparse. Apart from the aforementioned study by Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (1998),
a few researchers have looked at specific regions and time frames. Kim and Wei (1999a)
examine the transactions of different types of portfolio investors in Korea before and during
the Asian crisis, finding that non-resident institutional investors were always positive
feedback traders, while resident investors were contrarian traders before the crisis but
became positive feedback traders during the crisis. Herding appears to be more widespread
among individual and nonresident investors than among institutional and resident investors.
In another study, Kim and Wei (1999b) compare trading behavior in Korea by offshore
investment funds with that of funds registered in the U.S. and the UK, finding herding
behavior less prevalent among offshore funds. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1998) also study
transaction data from the Korean stock market during the crisis and find evidence for return-
chasing and herding among foreign investors before the crisis period, but no evidence for a
destabilizing effect of foreign investors over the entire sample period. While their data is of
high frequency, they are not able to trace trades originating from the same investor.
14
Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (1999) investigate trading strategies for 13 U.S. funds
investing in Latin America, reporting evidence for momentum strategies. The present paper
examines these issues on a global scale.
III. DATA
The data used in this paper are from a comprehensive database purchased from
Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc. It covers, on a monthly basis, the geographic asset
allocation of hundreds of equity funds with a focus on emerging markets for the period
1996:1-1999:3. While this period is not very long, the frequency of the data is higher than the
typical quarterly reporting. Moreover, the sample is particularly interesting, given the number
of emerging market crises that occurred over the period.
At the beginning of the sample, the database contains 382 funds with assets totaling
US$ 116.5 billion; at the end of the period, the number of funds covered is 467, managing
US$ 118.7 billion of assets. Note that, while the total number of funds increased over the
period, some funds were dropped from the database if their managers did not wish to
                                                
14 Some other studies have used more aggregate data on international portfolio flows. See
Bohn and Tesar (1996), Brennan and Cao (1997), and Tesar and Werner (1995). A few
studies have investigated the behavior of U.S. mutual and pension funds. See Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), and Wermers (1999).
Another study of international, but not emerging, financial markets is Kodres and Pritsker
(1996). They analyze herd behavior by large institutional futures participants using daily
position data.- 7 -
continue providing monthly information on their holdings. 309 funds are in the sample
throughout the period.
Slightly more than half of the funds covered are international, global emerging
markets, or regional funds, the rest being single-country funds (mainly Asian). In February,
1999, the sample consisted of 9 global funds (not focusing on emerging markets), 53 global
emerging market funds, 125 Asian regional funds (18 of which included equity holdings in
Japan), 170 Asian single-country funds, 13 Latin American single-country funds, 52 regional
Latin American funds, and 51 funds focusing on other geographic areas (12 of which were
single-country funds). Approximately one quarter of the funds are closed-end funds. The
funds are domiciled mostly in advanced economies and offshore banking centers.
Table 1 provides an overview of the different types of funds and their holdings by
region. The first interesting observation that can be made is that, while the total holdings of
these mutual funds in Latin America, Europe, Middle East and Africa increased, their
holdings in Asia decreased. An examination of the time series shows that, not surprisingly,
the major drop in the value of the Asian assets occurred during the Asian crisis of 1997.
Nevertheless, after the crisis total holdings in Asia were still more than twice as large as
those in Latin America and significantly exceeded those in Europe. Asia is also the region
with by far the largest number of single-country funds.
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   Note: Holdings in billions of US$ at the beginning of the month. * indicates that the number provided includes all
global emerging markets and international funds with assets in the respective region.- 8 -
How important are these funds as investors in emerging equity markets? In many
cases, the assets of these funds represent modest, but not insignificant fraction of the total
market capitalization. For example, in the case of Argentina, the funds held approximately
6.5 percent of the total stock market capitalization in August of 1998, while the share was
around 4.5 percent in Hungary and Korea. It should be pointed out, though, that in many
emerging markets, turnover is much lower than in mature markets, partly because ownership
is often less dispersed. Therefore, the trading of these funds might actually play a much
larger role than suggested by these aforementioned figures.
One limitation of the data set is that it provides asset positions in each country, while
we are mainly interested in the flows to individual countries. However, we calculate implied
flows from the asset position data under some assumptions concerning the stock valuation
changes. In particular, we assume that funds hold a portfolio of stocks that is well proxied by
the IFC US$ total return investable index.
15 In other words, for each country c and fund i in
month t we calculate the flow in the following way:
Flowcit = Total assetsi,c,t – Total assetsi,c,t-1 - Index returnct·Total assetsi,c,t-1        (1)
This obviously represents an approximation, and in certain cases, we might be
introducing substantial errors through this procedure. If individual fund managers were able
to beat the index, we would overstate the flow of funds into a country. However, consistency
checks for closed-end funds show that our approximation is quite good.
16 Moreover, for
many of the statistics discussed later, it is essentially the sign of the change in the position
that matters. It is unlikely that this method alters the sign of a fund’s transaction, in which
case we would erroneously classify net buyers as a net sellers or vice versa.
IV. FLOWS OVER TIME, ACROSS FUNDS, AND REGIONS
In a first attempt to examine the extent to which funds tend to move in tandem, we
compute simple correlations of the aggregate flows into individual countries for the whole
period. Appendix I shows the flow correlation matrix for all countries, with larger correlation
values shaded darker.
Correlations are higher within regions, partly reflecting the fact that the data include
many regional funds. For example, the correlation between flows to Hong Kong and other
                                                
15 In cases for which the IFC does not compute an investable index, we used the global index.
For countries not covered by the IFC, we employed MSCI US$ index data or national indices
converted into US dollars.
16 For closed-end funds, we can compute the growth in total assets calculated on the basis of
the IFC return series with the actual growth in assets. (This comparison is not possible with
open-end funds, since they are subject to redemptions). Without taking into account returns
on fixed income, the correlation between imputed and actual asset growth rates was 0.78.- 9 -
East Asian markets is very high, similarly to those between Mexico and other Latin
American countries.
17 To a lesser extent, this is also true for flows to Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa. This evidence is in line with that presented by Froot, O’Connell, and
Seasholes (1998), and consistent with a redemption-based explanation. If regional funds face
redemptions by individual investors, they may be forced to sell assets in other countries.
18
A different way of examining whether all funds move together is to look at gross
flows in- and out of regions. Figure 1 displays flows into the four major geographical regions
                                                
17 Hong Kong is typically classified as a mature market. Given than many emerging market
funds hold positions in Hong Kong, we include this market in all our calculations.
18 See Masson (1999).- 10 -
Figure 1. Gross and Net Flows by Region 
(Balanced Panel)
Source: Authors' calculation based on data from Emergin Market Funds Research, Inc. 
Note: All numbers are in millions of US$.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for the whole period, with net flows broken down into gross positive and negative flows. In
order to eliminate effects arising from the addition or deletion of funds from the sample, we
focus on a balanced subsample of 309 funds.
The pictures indicate that, except for the case of Middle East and Africa, inflows
contemporaneously coexist with outflows. Gross flows into and out of Asia are much higher
than for other regions. For Asia, we observe sizeable net outflows starting one month before
the collapse of the Thai baht in early July, and ending in November of that year. In the case
of Europe, there is a substantial drop in net inflows at the outset of the Russian crisis in July
and lasting until November. For Latin America, the figures show a sharp outflow one month
before the Brazilian devaluation, in December of 1998.
This first look at aggregate figures therefore suggests that, while not all funds always
move in the same direction, on a net basis, they tend to pull out together prior to crises. This
issue is investigated more closely in the next section, where we examine the behavior of
funds around specific events.
V.  FLOWS DURING CRISIS PERIODS
In this section, we characterize the salient features of flows around individual
currency crises. In particular, our data allow us to examine the following episodes in more
detail: (i) the Czech crisis of May 1997, (ii) the Asian crisis in the second half of 1997, (iii)
the Russian ruble collapse of August 1998, and (iv) the Brazilian devaluation of January
1999. For each of these episodes, we present flows to- and out of the affected countries and
other regions, as well as statistics on changes in the allocation of assets within funds. These
statistics provide a first insight into whether funds anticipated or possibly caused these crises,
whether funds moved simultaneously out of the countries affected, and whether they
contemporaneously reduced or increased holdings in other countries in and outside the
region. For example, did the Asian crisis lead to a reduction or increase of holdings in Latin
America? The predictions from portfolio theory in this regard are ambiguous.
19
The findings can be roughly summarized in the following way. Strikingly, in all
crises considered here, emerging market mutual funds in our sample tended to withdraw
funds from the affected country in the month prior to the crisis. This is particularly visible in
the cases of Brazil and Russia, and less marked for the Thai and Czech crises (Figure 2). To
some extent, this is not surprising, since a withdrawal of investors is exactly what brings
about a crisis. This evidence documents, however, that mutual funds were not laggards or
contrarian investors at the onset of these events. The flows to non-crisis countries and regions
at times of crises show no coherent pattern, but there are more comovements within than
across regions. Interestingly, funds did not withdraw indiscriminately from emerging
markets: in many cases, the same funds that left a crisis country invested in other markets
that were generally seen as suffering from contagion. For example, while it is true that during
                                                
19 See Schinasi and Smith (1999). When discussing portfolio allocations, one should bear in
mind that funds are typically constrained to invest a certain fraction of their assets in certain
groups of countries.- 12 -
the Russian crisis, in the aggregate funds withdrew on a massive scale from Latin America
and Asia, those funds in the sample that reduced their exposure in Russia, actually invested
in Latin America.
20
In the Czech case, after growing pressures on the exchange market in early 1997, the
authorities were forced to abandon the target band for the Czech koruna on May 27. Figure 2
shows that substantial outflows began to take place in April, continuing until July. According
to Appendix II, Table A2, these movements are not mirrored in other transition economies.
For example, inflows to Poland and Russia increased between April and June.
How did the allocation of assets within funds change? One way of examining this
issue is to compute the flows into other countries during the crisis for those funds that
withdrew money from the Czech Republic. The results show that these funds reshuffled
portfolios, increasing their assets in other economies in and outside the region (Appendix II,
Table A3). This evidence is consistent with the view that there were hardly any “contagion”
effects surrounding the Czech crisis.
21
The abandonment of the exchange-rate peg by the Thai authorities on July 2, 1997
marked the beginning of the Asian crisis. After a dip in May 1997, there was a renewal in
inflows from emerging market funds (Figure 2). From May onwards, outflows actually
diminished in size and only intensified again in January 1998. The regional picture is mixed
(Appendix II, Table A4). It is noteworthy that net outflows from Malaysia and Taiwan
Province of China were already very large in April 1997, and in the case of Malaysia these
outflows continued until October of that year. Moreover, it is apparent that funds reduced
their holdings in nearly all Asian countries in October 1997. That month also saw
withdrawals from all other regions except Middle East and Africa.
The within-fund statistics show that those funds that withdrew from Thailand also
withdrew from other markets in- and outside the region, with the exception of China. This is
also true when looking at those funds that reduced their assets in the other Asian crisis
countries: while reducing their assets across the board, funds slightly increased their
exposure to China (Appendix II, Table A5).
The Russian crisis broke out on August 17 of 1998, when the authorities devalued the
currency. Markets were not calmed by the devaluation, and on September 2, the ruble was
allowed to float. Figure 2 shows that mutual funds withdrew on a large scale from Russia in
July, the month preceding the devaluation. The outflow continued in August, diminishing in
September, when a mild positive net inflow was registered. An examination of flows to other
countries and regions in the same period reveals that, in the aggregate, funds did not reduce
their holdings in other European transition economies nor in other regions in July.
Interestingly, however, after the crisis erupted in August, there were not only withdrawals
from other countries in the region, but also very large net outflows from Asia and Latin
                                                
20 Note however, that the number of funds in our sample investing in Russia is quite small, as
can be seen in Table A7.
21 See Gelos and Sahay (2000).- 13 -
Figure 2. In- and outflows around crises
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Emerging Markets Funds Research, Inc. Numbers are in 
millions of US$ and based on a sample of funds that were in the database throughout the period. Vertical lines 





















































































































































































































































America. This is consistent with the widespread perception of “contagion” around the
Russian crisis.
22
While this is broadly supported by a look at changes in flows within funds, it is
noteworthy that on average, during the Russian crisis, funds that withdrew from Russia,
invested in Hungary, Poland and Latin America (Appendix II, Table A7). It therefore seems
that the large drops experienced in these stock markets around the Russian crisis may have
been due to funds that were not themselves exposed to the Russian market, a fact that
contradicts conventional wisdom.
On January 14, 1999, the Brazilian authorities were forced to let the currency float.
Funds anticipated this event to some extent, withdrawing funds on a large scale in December.
In that month, gross positive flows dipped to nearly zero, and net outflows reached US$ 400
million. However, January again saw net positive, albeit small, inflows. Table 5 shows that
net flows to other countries in Latin America were also mostly negative in December 1998,
although of much smaller magnitude. Similarly, Asia experienced a net outflow in that
month. Again, however, a look at more disaggregated data tells a more subtle story: funds
that withdrew from Brazil around the crisis, on average also withdrew from Argentina and
Mexico, but invested in Chile (see Appendix II).
VI. LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS
After a first assessment of the overall behavior of funds, an interesting question to
pose is whether there are leaders and followers within the industry. For example, one could
imagine regional or single-country funds to be more familiar with the specific economic
situation in the countries they invest in than funds investing globally. This may lead
global/international funds to imitate the behavior of single or regional funds. Similarly, if the
acquisition of country-specific information involves fixed costs, smaller funds may be at a
disadvantage relative to larger funds and may be induced to follow the strategies of the big
companies. Lastly, open-ended funds may be subject to redemptions by nervous individual
investors and be forced to reduce exposure to certain countries before closed-end funds. If
these open-ended funds are important enough to potentially ignite a crisis, closed-end funds
may be induced to follow them. It is therefore conceivable that a small fraction of mutual
funds may regularly be the originator of large stampedes into or out of a country.
While the frequency of our data limits the scope for investigating this question, we
make an attempt to examine whether some funds systematically precede others in their
trades. For this purpose, we divide funds into four pairs: single-country funds and non-single-
country funds, global/international and regional/single country funds, large and small funds,
and closed-end and open-ended funds. For each of these categories, we compute the sum of
total flows into each country and explore whether, controlling for returns, flows of one
                                                
22 Note, however, that some of the “contagion” effects witnessed at the time may have been
related to the LCTM collapse.- 15 -
category Granger-cause that of others. In order to limit problems of heteroskedasticity, we
scale flows by the lagged total assets in the respective country.
In the context of a panel VAR, some issues need to be addressed. It is well known
that fixed effects estimates of dynamic panel model estimates will be biased for finite T.
23 In
our case, these problems are not likely to be severe. First, our time dimension is quite large
(38 months). Second, since we want to investigate Granger causality, we are not primarily
interested in the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, but in the coefficient on the
other variable’s lags, and as shown by Judson and Owen (1999), the bias of these coefficients
is typically very small. Moreover, estimation methods designed to overcome this problem,
such as the one proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), suffer from their own drawbacks,
since the intruments used in the estimations (lagged levels for the differenced explanatory
variables) are typically very weak. We therefore first regress the variables on country
dummies, and then estimate the VAR’s  with pooled OLS using the residuals of those
regressions. All variables included in the regressions are stationary. We use the Akaike
criterion to select the appropriate lag length.
The results for regional and single-country funds vs. global and international funds
reveal an interesting pattern: inflows or outflows by regional or single-country funds
Granger-cause flows of global/international funds into the same country with a lag (Table 2).
However, Granger causality runs both ways since regional/single funds tend to react with an
outflow to inflows of global/international funds. Consistent with the reasoning above, the
results also show that open-ended funds’ flows Granger-cause closed-end funds investments.
The results are robust to the inclusion of time dummies and lagged returns.
This observation raises the question as to whether there are systematic performance
differences between single/regional and global funds and between open-ended and closed-
end funds. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to investigate this issue in detail.
                                                
23 See Nickell (1981).- 16 -

































































































































































































# of obs. 1155 1155 1138 1138 1149 1149
Note: “Own t-x” denotes values of the lagged dependent variable, lagged x periods. “Other t-x” denotes values
of the other endogenous variable included in the VAR, lagged x periods. T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
Small and large funds are defined as funds in the lower and upper size quintiles. P-values for Granger causality
tests are based on F-tests of joint signficance of all lagged “Other”.- 17 -
VII.   TESTING FOR HERDING
In this section, we compute and discuss a quantitative measure for the degree of
herding among funds. This measure, originally introduced by LSV, allows an assessment of
whether funds move in the same direction more often than one would expect if they traded
independently and randomly. The indicator, denoted HM (for herding measure), is given by:
HMit = |pit-E[pit]| - E|pit-E[pit]|, (2)
where pit is the proportion of all funds active in country i in month t that are buyers,
24
and E[pit] is its expected value. E[pit] may vary over time, and we approximate it by the total
number of net buyers across all countries divided by the total number of active funds in that
year.
25 Since the distribution of the absolute value of the first expression is not centered
around zero, we need to subtract its expected value. Under the null hypothesis of no herding,
this expected value is calculated assuming that the number of buyers follows a binomial
distribution.
In order to restrict our attention to a meaningful notion of a “herd”, we calculate the
herding measure only for those cases in which Nit exceeds five.
26 Moreover, in order to limit
the impact of errors introduced by our calculation of flows, we classify a fund as buyer or
seller only if the absolute value of the calculated (out-) flow into (or from) a country is larger
than one percent of the fund’s assets in that country.
27 HMit can be calculated for different
subgroups of funds, different types of emerging markets, and different time periods. Note
that our data do not allow us to differentiate between herding at the manager or individual
investor level; however, we are able to obtain some indirect evidence on the issue, which will
be discussed below.
The results indicate the presence of  significant, but not dramatic herding behavior.
Table 3 reports average values for HM for the four major regions and three subperiods. The
overall mean is 7.2 percent. In other words, this implies that for a given country, the number
of funds moving in the same direction was approximately 7 percent larger than one would
have expected if they acted independently and randomly. This number is approximately
twice as large as the values found by Wermers (1999) for U.S. mutual funds, and more than
                                                
24 We adopt the same notation as Wermers (1999).
25 Using yearly estimates for pit reflects a compromise between an attempt to control for
variations in overall capital flows to emerging markets (in order not to overestimate herding)
and, on the other hand, not underestimate herd behavior by overcorrecting for such general
trends.  However, we also experimented with a monthly estimate for pit, obtaining slightly
lower, but qualitatively similar results for our herding measure.
26 We repeated the computations considering only cases with a minimum of 15 transactions.
The results were very similar.
27 We also carried out the calculation using five percent as the error margin, without
significantly altering the results.- 18 -
twice the value reported by LSV for U.S. pension funds. Interestingly, the value is very
similar to the one reported by Kim and Wei (1999) for nonresident institutional investors
investing in Korea around the Korea crisis. However, it is not as large a figure as
conventional wisdom may have led one to expect. There is little variation in this average
across regions and over time. The numbers for Europe are initially lower, but they increased
over time. We also looked more specifically at the results for Asia, Latin America and
Europe around crisis episodes, without finding evidence for higher herding. Nevertheless,
specific months, including some of large outflows documented earlier, are characterized by
large herding measures (for example, the herding measure for Brazil one month prior to the
crisis is 16 percent). What we do not observe is that herding increases systematically across
countries during crisis times.
In contrast to herding at the country level, herding might be greater at the regional
level; for example, at a particular time, everybody may want to move into Latin America, but
not necessarily into the same markets. We investigated this possibility by treating whole
regions as individual assets, finding somewhat weaker evidence for herding (not shown).
28















































            Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Emerging Market Fund Research, Inc.
           The standard error of the mean is given in parentheses. All results are significant at the one
           percent level.
Nevertheless, there might still be important differences across different types of funds
or different countries. For example, the inclusion of single-country funds may tend to lower
the overall herding measure if these funds are required to hold a specific fraction of their
assets in a particular country and if they are limited in their ability to hold cash instead.
Similarly, offshore investment funds may display different investment patterns due to the
lower regulatory constraints they face. Closed-end funds are not subject to redemptions and
                                                
28 See LSV for an analogous exercise using industries instead of individual stocks.- 19 -
are therefore less likely to herd, as explained earlier.
29 Table 4 shows the herding measures
for different types of funds.
30
Table 4. Mean Herding Measures by Types of Funds
























































         Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Emerging Market Fund Research, Inc.
     Based on average size of all funds over time. Note: Standard error in parenthesis. *All results are significant
at the one percent level except in the case of smallest 20 percent funds in 1996 where the result is significant
only at the 10 percent level.  The smallest funds are exclusively Asian funds.
The results show that, contrary to our presumption, but in line with the results of Kim
and Wei (1999b), offshore funds tend to herd less than other funds. Confirming our
expectations, there is also less herding among small country funds.
31 Large, global and
international funds do not differ strongly in their herding behavior from the average. In line
with our a-priori reasoning, herding is also less pronounced among closed-end funds,
suggesting that the observed tendency for herding might to a significant extent be traceable to
the behavior at the individual investor’s level.
32
                                                
29 See Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (1999) for an attempt to distinguish between
herding at the manager and at the individual investor level.
30 Offshore funds are defined as those having their domicile in tax heavens. An alternative
definition would have classified all those funds as “offshore” if they did not invest primarily
in the country they were located. However, there are few single-country funds focusing on
the stock market of the country in which they have their domicile (Korean funds are among
thre exceptions). Excluding those “onshore” funds did not affect the main results.
31 Note however, that the smaller figure for small funds may reflect the fact that these funds
experienced a lower-than-average growth of inflows.
32 This of course raises questions regarding the incentives for individual investors to herd;
such incentives would  appear to be more difficult to explain than those at the fund manager
level.- 20 -
How important are these results quantitatively? In order to answer this question, we
follow Wermers (1999) in comparing the distributions of the actual monthly herding
measures to a simulated distribution obtained under the assumption that funds make their
buying decisions independently.
33 The distributions differ sharply: in contrast to the actual
distribution, the simulated distribution is nearly symmetric around zero.
One could argue that, despite controlling for time-varying propensities to buy, the
herding measure might overstate the extent of actual herding if there are many funds entering
our sample, since these funds will naturally tend to grow and therefore buy frequently. We
therefore carried out the calculations with a balanced subsample, i.e. only with funds that
stayed within the sample throughout the 39 months, obtaining very similar results (the mean
herding measure was 7.1)
                                                                                                                                                      
33 Details of the Monte Carlo simulation are given in Appendix III.- 21 -





































No. of obs.: 79800
Mean: 0.0036
Median: 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Emerging Market Fund Research, Inc.
There might be sizeable differences in the degree of herding depending on market
size. For smaller markets, it may be more difficult or at least relatively more costly to obtain
accurate information about fundamentals. If that is true, fund managers may be more inclined- 22 -
to imitate the behavior of other funds.
34 One the other hand, when they are subject to large
inflows or outflows, fund managers may go first to the most liquid markets, and gradually to
the less liquid ones. Table 5 displays the herding measures for the smallest and largest ten
stock markets that are covered by the IFC.
35 There is more herding in the case of the largest
stock markets than for the lowest, suggesting that the liquidity story is more relevant than the
informational explanation.
36
Table 5. Mean Herding Measures by Stock
Market Capitalization

















        Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from
        Emerging Market Fund Research, Inc. Standard
          errors in parentheses. All results are significant at the
           one percent level.
Finally, we also calculated the herding measure aggregating all funds that belong to
the same firm. This would be appropriate in the extreme case in which there was only one
fund manager managing all the mutual funds of a firm. After aggregation, we are left with an
average of only 74 funds per month. The mean herding measure obtained in this way is
somewhat lower, namely 5.4 percent. The lowest value was obtained for Europe (4.2 percent)
and the highest for Asia (6.3 percent).
What is the impact of herding on stock return behavior? If the amount of herding that
we detected among our group of investors had important effects on stock markets, we would
expect to observe a positive correlation between the degree of herding and stock return
volatility. In order to investigate this issue, we regressed the variance of stock-index returns
(computed for each country over the whole period) on the country-mean of the computed
                                                
34 See Banerjee (1992) and Calvo and Mendoza (1997) for models illustrating similar
arguments.
35 While we have even smaller markets in our sample, comparability of market capitalization
figures, and more importantly, the often very small number of transactions in these other
markets led us to focus on stock markets covered by the IFC for this comparison.
36 The fact that crises ocurred in countries with large market capitalization may also
contribute to this result, despite the fact that, as noted above, herding was not found to be
higher during crises.- 23 -
herding measures. The result from an OLS regression using 41 countries, reveals a
statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The coefficient on the mean
herding variable is 0.44, with a t-statistic of 11.6. The R
2 is quite high, namely 0.08. This
means that we can explain eight percent of the variability in stock return variance by
differences in herding among our investors. Note however, that this result should not be
overinterpreted, given that we made no attempt to control for other factors, such as business
cycle volatility (which itself may be endogenous). Moreover, reverse causality might be
present.
Overall, the data shows evidence for herding behavior, although the results are
weaker than what conventional wisdom might have led one to believe. There is no indication
that herding is more prevalent during crisis than during tranquil times. However, herding is
strongly associated with volatility.
VIII.   TESTING FOR POSITIVE FEEDBACK TRADING
Another way of looking at these funds’ investment strategies is to examine the extent
to which they follow “positive feedback” or “momentum” strategies. For this purpose, we
first examine whether the degree of herding can be related to past returns. If funds follow
momentum strategies, we should observe herding to be more pronounced for extreme prior-
month returns.
We also compute two measures of excess demand proposed by LSV and examine
their correlation with prior returns. The first measure, defined by LSV as the Numbers Ratio
(NR) is given for every given month t and country i by the total number of  buyers divided by
the total number of funds active in that country:
NR(i,t) = #buyers(i,t)/#active(i,t), (4)
The second measure, called the Dollar Ratio (DR), is the difference between in-and
outflows divided by the sum of in- and outflows to a country:
DR = (inflows(i,t)-outflows(i,t))/(inflows(i,t)+outflows(i,t)) (5)
Note that, in principle, both methods of measuring excess demand can yield opposite
results; in any given period, the majority of funds may be sellers, but a few large buyers may
dominate the picture.
The results are mixed. There is no clear relation between the herding measures and
past-month returns. If anything, there seems to be more herding for the average past
performers. While there is no visible relation between the country’s prior stock performance
and the subsequent number of funds buying in that market, the imbalance measured in dollars
(by DR) indicates that funds tended to buy past winners. This can be seen in Tables 6 and 7
which present simple averages for NR and DR by past-month performance. The findings for
DR are in line with findings by Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (1999). Interestingly, the- 24 -
figures indicate that positive-feedback trading is less pronounced in the case of single-
country funds. Moreover, there is no evidence that this behavior is accentuated during crisis
periods.
Table 6. Past-Month Performance, Herding Measures,



































1 (worst) 6.6 0.49 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.47 0.46
2 7.4 0.50 0.42 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.47
3 8.8 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.46 0.47
4 6.2 0.49 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.46
5 (best) 7.8 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.46
* Periods include 1997:08-1997:12, 1998:06-1998:10 and 1998:11-1999:02, which correspond to crises in Asia,
Russia, and Brazil, respectively. The classification by fund size is based on the average size of all funds over
time. Performance Quintiles refer to quintiles of the total return of the IFC stock market index across all
countries and dates except for the column referring to crises.






















1 (worst) -0.03 -0.38 -0.02 -0.21 -0.06 -0.13 -0.04
2 -0.01 -0.34  0.01 -0.25 0.04 -0.15 -0.10
3 -0.06 -0.26 -0.05 -0.25 0.11 -0.20 -0.08
4 -0.01 -0.43 -0.01 -0.16 0.08 -0.05 -0.09
5 (best)  0.05 -0.25 0.06 -0.12 0.07 -0.05 -0.00
Performance Quintiles refer to quintiles of the total return of the IFC stock market index across all countries and
dates except for the column referring to crises. The classification by fund size is based on the average size of all
funds over time. * Periods include 1997:08-1997:12, 1998:06-1998:10 and 1998:11-1999:02, which correspond
to crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, respectively.
A different methodology to assess the importance of momentum strategies has been
proposed by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995). Their momentum measure is given by:- 25 -
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where  t j w , and  t j R , denote portfolio weights and returns of country j at time t. This is
a momentum measure based on changes in portfolio weights in reaction to returns in the
previous period. It is positive if there is momentum trading.
Compared to NR and DR, this measure has advantages and drawbacks. Since it is
based on portfolio weights, and not on flows, the measure is likely to be more accurate in our
case. It focuses on strategies pursued by managers rather than individual investors, since a
withdrawal by individual investors would not per se result in a change of weights. On the
other hand, it also captures “passive” momentum strategies since portfolio weights might
change as a result of price movements without any trades taking place – but allowing for
such shifts in weights to happen is also a conscious decision of the portfolio manager, and
therefore of interest in this context. To complement the results from DR and NR, we
therefore follow Grinblatt et al. in documenting correlations between past returns and
changes in weights. However, we adopt a slightly different (and in our view more intuitive)
approach by reporting the coefficients of regressions from (wjt-wjt-1) on Ri,t-1.
37
According to these regressions, momentum strategies are more prevalent on the Sell-
than on the Buy side (Table 8). Except for the case of the smallest ten stock markets, the
coefficients on past returns are much higher for cases in which portfolio weights decreased
compared to those in which weights increased. In fact, for the whole set of funds there is no
statistically significant relationship between prior-month returns and changes in weights for
“Buys”. Interestingly, while the overall propensity to follow momentum strategies does not
change markedly during crises, the difference between the Buy- and Sell-side shrinks.
38
                                                
37 See Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (1999) for similar regressions.
38 Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (1999) find that the propensity to buy past winners and
sell past losers is stronger during non-crisis periods.- 26 -






























































The figures show the coefficients from regressions of (wjt-wjt-1) on Ri,t-1, and a constant, where wjt denotes the
portfolio weight of country i at time t and Ri,t-1 stands for the prior-month return in country i. The results
reported in the Buy (Sell-) row are those from regression restricted to observations where (wjt-wjt-1)> 0 (<0).
T-statistics are given in parenthesis. The R
2’s of the regressions (not shown) were very low, and mostly below
0.01.  *Periods include 1997:08-1997:12, 1998:06-1998:10 and 1998:11-1999:02, which correspond to crises in
Asia, Russia, and Brazil, respectively.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Having presented a variety of different results, it is useful to summarize the main
ones briefly. A first examination of flows yielded the following main findings:
•   Inflows contemporaneously coexist with outflows of similar magnitude.
•   The correlation of flows within regions is higher than across regions.
•   In all four crises examined, emerging market mutual funds withdrew large sums
from the affected country in the month prior to the crisis. This is particularly
visible in the cases of Brazil and Russia.
•   The investment behavior of emerging market funds is more complex than often
suggested: in many cases, funds that withdrew money from a crisis country
invested in other countries that were seen as suffering from contagion effects. 
•   Inflows of regional and single-country funds tended to precede those of global
and international funds. Similarly, open-ended funds’ investments Granger-cause
closed-end funds.
The tests of herding and feedback trading gave the following results:
•   There is only moderate evidence of herding behavior. There are no dominant
patterns across funds and over time, although herding is more prevalent in large- 27 -
emerging markets. Herding is less pronounced among closed-end funds,
suggesting that herding behavior might to a significant extent be traceable to
individual investors’ behavior. Differences in the degree of herding across
countries are correlated with stock return volatility.
•   Emerging market funds tend to sell past losers and buy past winners, but this
behavior was less visible in the case of the Asian countries during the crisis.
While herding and positive feedback trading appear to be relevant phenomena within
this class of investors, these results do not support the view that their behavior is mainly
determined by panics and mere imitating behavior.- 26 - APPENDIX I
TABLE A1. CORRELATION OF AGGREGATE FLOWS ACROSS COUNTRIES




india 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
indones. 0.00 -0.05 0.32 -0.03
korea 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.11
m alays. 0.00 -0.02 0.31 0.07 0.31 -0.27
pakistan 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.01
philipp. 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.08 0.30 0.06 0.32 -0.01
singap. 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.02 0.32 0.09 0.33 -0.02 0.26
sri lanka 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.12
taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00
thailand 0.00 -0.01 0.20 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.01 0.01
vietnam 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.21 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
argent. 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.16 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01
brazil 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.01 -0.05 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.33
chile 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.05
colombia 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.02
m exico 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.06
peru 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.01
venezuela 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.12
ecuador 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.07
panama 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02
croatia 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.19 -0.02
czech rep. 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.10
greece 0.00 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.07
hungary 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.01
poland 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.04
portugal 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.17 0.05
romania 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
russia 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.10 0.07 0.00
slovak rep. 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
turkey 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.29 0.12 0.10 0.00
botswana 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
egypt 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.13
ghana 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.09
israel 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.02
jordan 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.03
kenya 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.02
m auriti 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.01
m orocco 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.15 0.00
s. africa 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.28 0.09 0.16 -0.01
zimbabwe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05- 27 - APPENDIX I
venezue ecuador panama croatia czech rep. greece hungary poland portugal romania russia slovak rep. turkey botswana egypt ghana israel jordan
ecuador -0.09
panama 0.02 0.03
croatia 0.00 0.07 0.00
czech rep. 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.02
greece 0.12 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03
hungary 0.07 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.16 -0.22
poland 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.28 -0.03 0.39
portugal 0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.36 -0.08 -0.01
romania 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.04
russia 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.01
slovak rep. -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.27 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.04
turkey 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.06
botswana 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
egypt -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.05 0.06
ghana -0.03 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.01
israel 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.14 -0.31 0.42 0.26 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.15 -0.02
jordan 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 -0.05
kenya 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.10 -0.01
m auriti 0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00
m orocco -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.03
s. africa 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.14 0.16 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.25 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.23 -0.01
zimbabwe -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.01
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Emerging Markets Funds Research, Inc.-  28 - APPENDIX II
THE BEHAVIOR OF FUNDS AROUND CRISES
Table A2. Aggregate flows to different countries and regions around Czech crisis
—————————————————————————————————————
Jan-97 Feb-97 Mar-97 Apr-97 May-97 Jun-97
Czech Stock Mtk. Return % 4.2 4.1 -10.0 -7.5 -10.9 4.0
Net Flows
Czech Rep. 20 10 10 -24 -20 -23
Hungary -9 -6 4 1 -40 -6
Poland -32 -18 -2 6 31 37
Russia -58 -83 60 154 113 -38
S l o v a k i a 01522 - 1
Europe -114 -83 -19 181 53 30
Asia -170 175 619 -559 -84 -1313
Latin America 335 148 217 278 86 214
Middle East & Africa 41 72 107 107 115 179
—————————————————————————————————————
    Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from IFC and Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc.
    Note: Based on balanced sample of funds. Flows are in millions of dollars
Table A3. Mean Investment of Funds that Withdrew Money from the Czech Republic
around the Czech Crisis, by Country, 1997:04-1997:06




Czech Rep. 57 -2.0 2.9 -12.3 -.0
Hungary 57 0.5 2.3 -5.1 11.5
Poland 57 0.7 4.2 -6.6 27.6
Russia 57 2.7 13.3 -11.6 82.6
Slovak Rep. 57 0.0 0.3 -1.1 1.4
Latin America 57 5.1 19.2 -15.3 87.8
Europe 57 2.4 16.1 -16.9 93.1
Asia 57 14.6 55.1 -54.2 334.5-  29 - APPENDIX II
Table A4. Aggregate Flows to Different Countries and Regions around Asian Crisis
—————————————————————————————————————
Apr-97 May-97 Jun-97 Jul-97 Aug-97 Sep-97 Oct-97 Nov-97 Dec-97 Jan-98 Feb-98 Mar-98
Thai Mkt Return % -5.3 -12.9 -9.7 6.7 -33.1 5.9 -32.5 -12.7 -22.2 35.8 28.2 -6.5
Hong Kong Mkt Ret. % 3.0 14.3 3.0 7.8 -13.7 6.6 -29.3 -0.9 1.6 -13.6 24.0 0.3
Korea Mkt Return % 3.1 7.9 1.7 -3.6 -3.8 -9.6 -29.7 -26.9 -33.0 69.8 -7.6 0.7
Net Flows
Thailand 221 -33 50 298 159 191 101 73 156 -131 68 51
Indonesia 25 -88 -57 -38 77 -66 89 125 149 75 -27 -10
Korea 27 312 345 131 -40 92 -600 87 133 209 357 -78
Malaysia -435 -398 -369 -128 -399 -364 -25 13 131 -14 8 97
Philippines -44 -102 -110 18 -34 46 47 -1 18 31 -63 120
Hong Kong 123 -216 -908 -361 35 -808 -344 152 -6 324 291 27
China -19 147 64 -105 177 96 19 173 -81 147 -51 142
Taiwan -232 37 151 12 -98 -598 -658 86 -61 255 210 222
Singapore -73 118 -274 129 -215 -40 -47 -79 -46 182 73 -4
Europe 164 38 47 -70 348 -198 -11 -189 -258 122 179 84
Middle East & Africa 103 111 177 126 283 202 220 -30 46 -45 44 109
Asia -539 -30 -1300 -23 -306 -1287 -1404 554 413 1047 785 531
Latin America 272 89 204 -279 81 395 -479 305 218 -158 156 106
—————————————————————————————————————
    Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from IFC and Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc.
    Note: Based balanced sample of funds.
Table A5. Mean Investment of Funds that Withdrew Money from Thailand around the
 Asian Crisis, by Country, 1997:04-1998:03




Thailand 874 -1.8   4.1 -68.3 0.0
Indonesia 874 -0.4   3.5 -66.4 38.1
Koreas 874 0.2   7.0 -67.7 105.1
Malaysia 874 -1.7   7.6 -161.4 17.1
Philippines 874 -0.3   3.1 -41.4 32.8
Hong Kong 874 -1.6 37.6 -991.0 322.9
China 874 0.3   4.3 -49.0 68.9
Taiwan 874 0.5   9.8 -39.7 172.0
Singapore 874 -0.7 11.5 -317.5 53.2
Europe 874 -0.1   8.1 -74.0 100.7
M.E. & N.A. 874 0.2   5.5 -32.6 85.7
Latin America 874 -0.0 14.1 -134.3 166.9-  30 - APPENDIX II
Table A6. Aggregate Flows to Different Countries and Regions Around Russian Crisis
—————————————————————————————————————
Apr-98 May-98 Jun-98 Jul-98 Aug-98 Sep-98 Oct-98
Russia Stock
Mtk. Return % -3.1 -39.9 -20.5 0.6 -58.7 -41.9 48.4
Net Flows
Russia 11 236 137 -159 -92 53 -30
Czech Republic 6 13 3 9 -5 -5 -22
P o l a n d - 1 5 - 5- 7 3 11 6 - 8 1 7
Hungary -2 -34 -3 18 -29 -3 21
S l o v a k i a - 2- 3 2 5 - 2- 2- 4
Europe 148 202 36 -130 -118 -4 -47
M.E. & Africa 280 39 19 181 -37 2 -74
Asia 546 -72 -184 317 -1003 -167 -95
Latin America 124 -301 -142 867 -427 529 385
—————————————————————————————————————
   Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from IFC and Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc.
   Note: Based on balanced sample of funds. Flows are given in millions of U.S. dollars.
Table A7. Mean investment of Funds that Withdrew Money from Russia Around the
 Russian Crisis, by Country--1998:04-1998:10




Russia 120 -3.3 9.4 -0.2 0.0
Czech Rep. 120 -0.2 2.4 -14.4 9.3
Hungary 120 0.2 3.9 -10.3 31.8
Poland 120 0.6 2.9 -5.4 13.9
Slovak Rep. 120 -0.0 0.4 -1.9 3.1
Europe 120 -3.6 9.4 -57.2 16.6
Latin America 120 10.2 60.3 -41.4 588.9
M.E. & N.A. 120 0.8 9.5 -46.0 65.0-  31 - APPENDIX II
Table A8. Aggregate Flows to Different Countries and Regions Around Brazilian Crisis
—————————————————————————————————————
Sep-98 Oct-98 Nov-98 Dec-98 Jan-99 Feb-99 Mar-99
-0.5 5.0 19.8 -18.8 -28.1 5.9 40.3
Net Flows
Brazil 136 94 198 -400 56 33 -119
Argentina 63 -65 -72 -61 92 -37 -104
Chile 75 22 -93 80 42 -3 -40
Colombia -3 -2 -2 2 -2 0 -1
Mexico 176 308 45 -89 74 219 33
Venezuela 11 -22 -3 -7 -4 -7 5
Europe -21 -24 98 132 74 -49 -54
M.E. & Africa 14 -68 -2 1 17 179 88
Asia -148 -106 145 -319 261 132 491




   Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from IFC and Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc.
   Note: Based on balanced sample of funds. Flows are given in millions of U.S. dollars.
Table A9. Mean Investment of Funds that withdrew Money from
Brazil Around the Asian Crisis, by Country (1998:11-1999:02)




Brazil 214 -3.3 10.9 -121.4 0.0
Argentina 214 -1.0 8.1 -103.5 16.3
Chile 214 0.4 3.3 -3.7 36.8
Colombia 214 0.0 0.3 -1.8 3.0
Mexico 214 -0.4 4.7 -24.2 41.6
Venezuela 214 0.0 0.6 -5.1 3.5
Europe 214 0.7 9.3 -21.3 116.8
M.E. & N.A. 214 0.2 6.9 -44.4 74.4
Asia 214 0.5 27.0 -139.3 312.0- 32 - APPENDIX III
SIMULATING THE HERDING MEASURE DISTRIBUTION
Following Wermers (1999), we use a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to generate a
simulated distribution of herding measures under the null hypothesis of independent trading.
For each month t, the number of funds investing in a given country i in month t, is generated
as a draw from a binomial distribution. More precisely, if nit is the number of actual trades in
a country, (if nit is greater or equal than five), we produce nit draws from a U(0,1) distribution
with a random number generator. Each draw is rounded up to one if it is greater than 1- E[pit]
(where E[pit] is the actual proportion of funds buying in that year, as explained in Section
VII); other wise it is rounded down to zero. These outcomes are summed up, yielding a draw
from a binomial distribution b(nit, E[pit]). Based on this simulated data, we calculate the
simulated herding measures. We repeat this procedure 50 times, obtaining a sample of  79800
simulated herding measures.-  33 -
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